On Thursday night, September 10, 2026, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) detonated a vast underground complex beneath the Ali Al‑Taher ridge that dominates Nabatiyeh, Lebanon. The blast, reported by the Lebanese National News Agency (NNA), registered a 4.1‑magnitude tremor that reverberated through Nabatiyeh and neighboring villages.

According to the IDF, the complex—spanning more than two kilometres—contained a central command centre for Hezbollah’s Badr unit, weapons stores, rockets, missiles, drones, and living quarters for fighters. In a statement released the following day, the IDF said it had destroyed the command centres, weapons stores, and other military infrastructure, and that it now possessed “operational control” of the ridge both above and below ground.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz hailed the operation as the final step in consolidating Israel’s self‑declared security zone inside southern Lebanon. The strike has intensified an already volatile situation: Nabatiyeh, a predominantly Shia city and long‑standing Hezbollah stronghold, has endured repeated Israeli strikes since the start of the 2026 Lebanon war. Residents, many of whom have lived there for generations, fear that continued bombardment could lead to the city’s destruction.

In the days that followed the explosion, Lebanese Army vehicles appeared in greater numbers on Nabatiyeh streets. Citizens welcomed the soldiers with flowers and rice—a gesture that underscored the political weight of the army’s presence. While the army had been stationed in the city before, the increased deployment and public reception signal a shift in local sentiment.

The surge in support for the army coincides with the launch of “Nabatiyeh 2,” a petition signed by more than 400 residents. Issued a day after the explosion, the appeal calls on the Lebanese state to assume responsibility for the city’s security, deploy the army in and around Nabatiyeh, and restore decision‑making about war and peace exclusively to legitimate state institutions.

Signatories include doctors, engineers, lawyers, bankers, journalists, academics, writers, activists and MP Firas Hamdan. Bahjat Mirza, a long‑time Nabatiyeh resident, said the petition comes from “people of the land—people who are not politically inclined in any particular direction.” He added that the appeal is simply a call for the Lebanese Army to be present, a role he says the army has had since 1948.

Dr. Ali Hassan Wehbe, a dentist and former parliamentary candidate, described the appeal as a civil request, not a partisan statement. He noted that his dental clinic in Nabatiyeh has been destroyed three times—during the 2006 war, again in 2024 and most recently in 2026. Wehbe said the appeal is “fundamentally about removing Israel’s pretext and saving Nabatiyeh,” and rejected accusations that the petition is treasonous, arguing that “the Lebanese Army should enter. They are our sons.”

The petition explicitly holds Israel responsible for occupation, killing and destruction, but it also calls for accountability from those who controlled security decisions and promised that Hezbollah’s weapons could protect southern Lebanon. While the petition does not name Hezbollah directly, the target of its criticism is clear.

The explosion at Ali Al‑Taher has prompted analysis of the ridge’s strategic importance. According to the IDF, the underground complex included a central command centre for Hezbollah’s Badr unit—a key component of the group’s territorial command and rocket operations north of the Litani River. The IDF said it would remain in the area to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its presence.

Political observers note that the petition’s focus on state sovereignty over security reflects a broader shift in southern Lebanon. In 2019, protests in Nabatiyeh challenged Hezbollah and Amal, but the focus was on governance and economic mismanagement. The current appeal, by contrast, questions the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s claim that its independent arsenal is necessary to defend the south.

Joelle Abboud, a member of the Kataeb Party’s political bureau, said the demand for state sovereignty over southern villages is a national demand that has always existed across sects. She added that the welcome given to the Lebanese Army in Nabatiyeh shows that southerners want the state to assume the role long claimed by Hezbollah.

The situation remains fluid. The IDF’s operation has secured the ridge, but the broader conflict continues. The Lebanese government has approved a Homeland Shield Plan to disarm all militias, including Hezbollah, and the Lebanese Army is expanding its presence in southern Lebanon. The next steps will involve monitoring the area, ensuring that the army can maintain security, and determining whether the state can replace Hezbollah’s security role in the region.

The explosion and the subsequent petition illustrate a growing unease among residents of Nabatiyeh about relying on Hezbollah for protection. Whether this sentiment will translate into a lasting shift in the south’s security dynamics remains to be seen, but the current developments underscore the complex interplay between local communities, state institutions, and non‑state armed groups in Lebanon’s fragile security environment.