Israels Gaza War Deepens Political Polarization, Polls Show Netanyahu Losing Public Support
A July 2026 analysis by political scientist Wesam Bahrani shows that the emergency coalition formed in the wake of the attacks—comprising Defence Minister Benny Gantz and former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot—was a temporary patchwork response to a national crisis. The partnership unraveled in June 2024 when Gantz and Eisenkot resigned, and the war’s relentless escalation has since magnified the rift between the governing bloc, the opposition, and key security institutions.
Netanyahu’s popularity has plunged. A March 2025 poll of settlers revealed that 87 percent blamed the Prime Minister for the October 7 failure, and 72.5 percent called for his resignation either immediately or after the war’s conclusion. By July 2025, overall confidence in Netanyahu had slipped to 40 percent, while support for Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir rose to 68.5 percent. A June 2026 survey indicated that 61 percent of Israelis believed Netanyahu should not run in the next elections. That same poll found that 57 percent of coalition supporters trusted the government, compared with only 5 percent of opposition supporters. Moreover, 66 percent of settlers felt social solidarity was weak, a figure that climbed to 80 percent among opposition supporters.
The conflict’s reach extended beyond the political arena into Israel’s security and judicial spheres. The dismissal of the Shin Bet chief triggered a Supreme Court case, and the appointment of a new Mossad director was mired in legal objections and court challenges before the Supreme Court ultimately approved the decision. These episodes illustrate how the war shifted the focus from wartime strategy to the governance of key institutions.
Even before the hostilities, Israel was already embroiled in a period of intense internal division, largely driven by the judicial reform crisis and widespread protests. Many observers anticipated that the security threat would unite the country or at least postpone the internal crisis. The prolonged conflict, however, revealed the limits of that expectation. Instead of quelling pre‑existing disputes, the war interacted with the existing political reality, dredging up old disagreements and creating new fault lines tied to the conduct of the war itself.
Bahrani’s study identifies several fresh arenas of contention that have surfaced since October 7. These include the priority of recovering hostages versus continuing military operations, the future status of the Gaza Strip, legislation on ultra‑Orthodox military conscription, the distribution of war burdens, and the boundaries between political leadership and the military establishment. The war has also intensified debates over social solidarity, with a growing perception that society is more divided and polarized.
As of July 2026, Israel faces a political landscape that is more fragmented than it was before October 7. The emergency government’s dissolution, the resignations of key ministers, and the Supreme Court’s involvement in security appointments have all contributed to a broader and more complex map of disputes. The next Israeli legislative election, scheduled for 2026, will likely hinge on these unresolved issues, as well as on public sentiment regarding Netanyahu’s leadership and the conduct of the war.
The current situation remains fluid. While the war continues, the government must navigate a divided electorate, manage legal challenges to security appointments, and address widespread calls for political reform. The Supreme Court’s recent approval of the Mossad director’s appointment signals a temporary resolution, but the underlying tensions between the governing coalition, the opposition, and security institutions persist. The outcome of the upcoming election and any subsequent coalition negotiations will determine whether Israel can achieve a sustainable political consensus or whether the war’s legacy of polarization will continue to shape its domestic politics.